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В контексте нового социального поворота в философии науки рассмотрение
преимуществ подхода, предложенного Выготским, может представлять значи
тельный интерес, поскольку здесь особое место в объяснении процесса разви
тия когнитивных функций субъекта уделяется роли культуры и социализации.
Между тем философское осмысление идей Выготского в этом ракурсе все еще
не было осуществлено. В качестве первого шага предлагается подход к пробле
ме научного представления, основанный на концепции Выготского. Автора ин
тересует понимание русским психологом проблемы природы и функции поня
тий, опосредования и так называемой области проксимального развития. Автор
полагает, что научные представления, опосредуя научное познание формируют
специальный контекст, в котором становятся частью целой системы, отражаю
щей социальные практики в их отношении к научному исследованию. Выгот
ский считает, что такова функция научных понятий. Они заменяют реальные
процессы и эффекты, передавая свойства репрезентируемых систем. Предло
женное Выготским решение проблемы онтологического статуса понятий указы
вает на аналогичное понимание им абстрактных моделей, которые следует рас
сматривать иначе, чем абстрактные фикции, или абстрактные объекты.
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In the quest for a new social turn in philosophy of science, exploring the prospects
of a Vygotskian perspective could be of significant interest, especially due to Vu-
gotsky ’s emphasis on the role of culture and socialisation in the development of
cognitive functions. However, a philosophical reassessment of Vygotsky’s ideas in
general has yet to be done.
As a step towards this direction, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific
representations by drawing inspirations from Vygotsky. Specifically, I work upon
Vygotsky’s understanding on the nature and function of concepts, mediation and
zone of proximal development.
I maintain that scientific representations mediate scientific cognition in a tool-li-
ke fashion (like Vygotsky’s signs). Scientific representations are consciously ac-
quired through deliberate inquiry in a specific context, where it turns to be part of
a whole system, reflecting the social practices related to scientific inquiry, just
scientific concepts do in Vygotsky’s understanding. They surrogate the real pro-
cesses or effects under study, by conveying some of the features of the represented
systems. Vygotsky’s solution to the problem of the ontological status of concepts
points to an analogous understanding for abstract models, which should be regar-
ded neither as fictions nor as abstract objects.
I elucidate these views by using the examples of the double-helix model of DNA
structure and of the development of our understanding of the photoelectric effect.
Key words: Vygotsky, concept, mediation, zone of proximal development, scientific
representation, models.
Introduction
In the quest for a new social turn in philosophy of science, exploring
the prospects of a Vygotskian perspective could be of significant interest.
Vygotsky has been more or less ignored in Western philosophical and
scientific debates for a very long time. The main reason for that is that he
was a Russian Marxist in the Soviet era; therefore there is/was an obvious
political bias. Moreover, Western philosophers and scientists use(d) to pay
little attention to the role of culture and socialisation in the development of
cognitive functions.
The majority of philosophers who have dealt with Vygotsky’s work
tend to either draw comparisons with other philosophical currents (i.e.
pragmatism), or to discuss it in the light of recent debates in the cognitive
sciences. In other fields (i.e. pedagogy) there have been attempts to recon-
struct the philosophical implications of Vygotsky’s views (i.e. about cultu-
ral influence in concept acquisition). However, these debates have not yet
drifted in “mainstream” philosophy. It seems, then, that a philosophical re-
assessment of Vygotsky’s ideas in general has yet to be done. As a step to-
wards this direction, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific repre-
sentations by drawing inspiration from Vygotsky.
Perception, activity, and scientific cognition
In accordance with Wartofsky, I consider representations to be percep-
tual artifacts which we do not perceive, but by means of which we perceive
real objects or processes [Wartofsky, 1973/1979: 194]. Our ability, as co-
gnitive agents, to represent actions by symbolic means generates represen-
tations as a distinctive class of artifacts.
However, it seems that the majority of the approaches which have been
proposed so far on scientific representations, regardless of their specific
features or the trend they belong to, are ground–ed on the epistemological
view that knowledge is the result of observation-description. This amounts
to commitment to a certain variety of views on the problem of perception.
I adopt a Vygotskian stance on perception, according to which we per-
ceive a thing where it is, its properties in relation to itself and its relations in
the context of its localization with respect to other things. Human percepti-
on turns to be a social activity, depending on and determined by cognitive
artifacts (such as language and signs), concepts, and so forth, which are
produced and employed in social terms. In this context, perception, sensati-
on and cognition are all considered to be functions of action (for further
discussion, see [Vygotsky, 1978; Hyman, 2009; Zaporozhets, 2002]). On
these grounds, I contend that in the analysis of cognitive processes human
activity should be at the epicenter; to know means to manipulate the object
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of knowledge, to transform it into a tool of action. In this context, scientific
representations should be construed as active representations of reality,
functioning as tools for scientific cognition.
The social aspect is inherent in scientific representation. As Hessen fa-
mously suggested, social practice determines the problems science is dea-
ling with and therefore the direction of scientific inquiry and the formulati-
on of scientific concepts and theories; those of them that fail to correspond
to social needs inevitably dissolve [Hessen, 2009]. Hence, even before it is
given birth, a representation bears significant history, since, obviously, the
scientist who created it is not a blind-deaf child in an empty, sealed room;
rather, s/he is a social product. Moreover, from the very first moment of its
employment in a scientific inquiry, it is loaded with an enormous amount
of social by-products, such as the social needs which foster the scientific
inquiry, the socially formulated lenses through which the results of the in-
quiry are evaluated, or even the material artifacts used to conduct the speci-
fic inquiry in the research laboratory, that came out of social production
and so forth, not to mention the social relations within which every single
scientist who employs a specific representation in his/hers research lives
and works.
Scientific representations and Vygotskian
concepts
Following M. Wartofsky, I maintain that models and theories are re-
presentational cognitive artifacts that function as means of self-conscious-
ness of human as social being. On this ground, they could be conceived of
as being putative modes of action, representations of prospective practi-
ce(s), or of acquired modes of action.
This view echoes Vygotksy’s understanding of concepts (for a detailed
discussion, see: [Vygotsky, 1987: ch. 6; John-Steiner, 2007; van der Weer,
1994; Wells, 1994; Berger, 2005]). Vygotsky describes concepts as parts
of a system of representation which contains different levels of abstraction
and degrees of relatedness to our understanding of reality via other
concepts.
In this multifold representation, there are interrelated hierarchies based
on already formulated concepts to facilitate the introduction of new ones.
In a concept, the bonds between the parts of an idea and between different
ideas are logical and ideas are part of a socially-accepted system of hierar-
chical knowledge. According to Vygotsky, we are conscious of external
reality and the whole system of internal experiences in a system of con-
cepts [Vygotsky 1998: 127]. Our cognitive confrontation with reality is not
subservient to sense-data but a tendency to interact, to actively participate
in its phenomena.
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According to Vygotsky, concepts arise within some specific social
practice in the form of a problem and a solution [Vygotsky, 1987: P. 123,
127]. There could be cases in which it could be argued that the discovery of
a solution gives rise to the identification of the problem. In any case,
though, a concept always names a situation and arises in the course of an ef-
fort to solve a problem, which arises within a definite system of social prac-
tices.
Let me attempt to elucidate the relevance of what has been said thus far
to our discussion on scientific representations by an example taken from
the history of physics. I will be dealing with the development of our under-
standing of the photoelectric effect and its role in advancing our understan-
ding of the nature of light and the development of quantum physics1. Du-
ring his experiments that confirmed Maxwell’s electomagnetic theory in
1887, Hertz observed that, by shining ultraviolet light onto metal electro-
des, he could lower the voltage needed to make sparks hop between the
electrodes. This observation obviously implied that light had some electri-
cal effect but Hertz could not explain the phenomenon.
Two years later, J.J. Thomson showed that when ultraviolet light falls
onto a metal surface, it triggers the emission of negatively charged parti-
cles. It should be noted that some years later Thomson introduced his atom-
ic model, according to which atoms are uniform spheres of positively char-
ged matter in which electrons are embedded. Thus, the photoelectric effect
seemed to happen because electrons inside the atoms in a metal’s surface
were vibrated by the oscillating electric field of light waves falling on the
metal. Due to these vibrations, some of the electrons eventually were tos-
sed out altogether.
In 1902, Lenard, one of Hertz’s earlier assistants, went on to study the
photoelectric effect and made the first quantitative measurements about it.
He found that higher frequency light increased the kinetic energy of the
electrons, while changing the light intensity had no effect on the kinetic
energy. These findings could not be explained by classical physics, accor-
ding to which, when light shines on a surface, it slowly transfers energy in-
to the substance. This increases the kinetic energy of the particles until fi-
nally, they give off excited electrons. Thus, it was expected that increasing
light intensity, regardless of frequency, would result in photoelectrons with
higher kinetic energies. In addition, since the substance must first reach a
critical temperature before it can begin ejecting electrons, it was expected
that the photoelectric effect would not be observed immediately.
One should recall that in the meantime, Planck had introduced energy
quanta, by arguing that electromagnetic energy could be emitted only
in quantized form. Lenard’s observations and Planck’s theory could be
seen as arrows pointing arguably to the same direction. However, it was
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This is a rather rough sketch of the actual story, for the sake of my argumentation.
Wheaton (1978 & 2009) discusses the issue in detail.
only in 1905 that Einstein applied quantization, not to blackbody oscilla-
tors as Planck had previously done, but to the actual radiation that is emit-
ted or absorbed. Thus, he came to realize that light itself is quantized and
explained the photoelectric effect mathematically by proposing the con-
cept of light quanta, or photons. This conclusion runs counter to the classic
understanding of physics and is better understood in the context of wa-
ve-particle duality. If one reads what has previously been said about con-
cepts by changing “concept” to “scientific representation”, s/he could get
an apt description of the aforementioned episode. Let me clarify that I do
not equate scientific representations with concepts; I just use Vygotsky’s
understanding of concepts in order to build analogies with my understan-
ding of the function of scientific representations.
Let us return to the Vygotskian understanding of concepts. According
to him, scientific concepts have four distinctive features: generality, syste-
mic organization, conscious awareness and voluntary control. Scientific
concepts are not primarily distinguished from spontaneous concepts in re-
spect of the fields to which they apply; rather, it is the way in which they re-
late to experienced reality. Spontaneous concepts are related to the world
of experience in a direct but relatively ad hoc manner. On the contrary,
scientific concepts are both more abstract and more general. Their primary
relationship is to other concepts within the relevant system and only indi-
rectly to the particular objects and events that they subsume.
A new scientific concept ultimately enters into the discourse of the re-
levant social practice and could make its way into the language and subse-
quently participate in restructuring the relevant social practices. A scienti-
fic concept is consciously acquired through deliberate inquiry in a specific
context, where it turns to be part of a whole system, reflecting the social
practices related to scientific inquiry, just as scientific representations do.
Word meaning and the function of scientific
representations
Let me now turn to the relation between concepts and Vygotsky’s con-
ception of word meaning. According to Vygotsky, word meaning is the
unit of analysis for the study of verbal thinking. A word is a sign for a con-
cept and meaning is an act of both speech and thinking. Thus, word mea-
ning is an act of indicating a concept to another person or oneself. Just as
word meanings develop, concepts develop, both ontogenetically and histo-
rically. In this sense, word meaning is a “complex and true act of thinking”
[Vygotsky, 1987: 169] which develops and the psychological form of the
concept which is indicated by the word meaning is itself also developing.
Since a word does not itself have any meaning, people make meaning and
use the word for the action of meaning-making. Thus, the concept is repre-
sented by word meaning. In Vygotsky’s words, “[i]t is a functional use of
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the word, or any other sign, as a means of focusing one’s attention, selec-
ting distinctive features and analyzing and synthesizing them, that plays a
central role in concept formation [Vygotsky, 1987: 106]. The parallelizati-
on with my understanding on the function of scientific representations in
scientific cognition should be obvious.
This parallelization goes even further, as, according to Vygotsky, a
concept exists objectively, albeit implicitly, in our activities and the social
properties of the artifacts we, as human social beings, use. However, word
meaning is not simply objective. As an action, it is both subjective and ob-
jective — in other words, it is an expression of the dialectical unity of ob-
jective and subjective. It is through word meaning that concepts are mani-
fested for the person psychologically and become true concepts in the cour-
se of cognitive development. We now have in hand the Vygotskian
solution to the problem of the ontological status of concepts. This solution
radically differs from views according to which concepts should be regar-
ded either as mental images (or any other kind of internal representation) or
as something objective, which inhabits the world. This solution pinpoints
to an interesting answer to metaphysical concerns about the status of ab-
stract models, which should be regarded neither as fictions nor as abstract
objects. The philosophical underpinning could be given by E.V. Ilyenkov’s
approach on the concept of the ideal [Ilyenkov, 1977]; however, a further
elaboration of this idea is beyond the scope of this paper.
Ergo, to return to the point from which I departed to discuss Vygots-
ky’s understanding of concepts, I contend that, in such a context, a scienti-
fic representation is not a mirror-image of reality, but an active representa-
tion of it, which functions as a tool for scientific cognition. Scientific repre-
sentations serve as means for action, given that scientific cognition is an
activity of the human-agent. They are instruments of scientific activity that
enable us not only to interfere and interact with the world according to our
purposes, but also to gain new perspectives in our understanding of the
world we inhabit.
Vygotskian mediation and the mediating role of
scientific representations
Let me now turn to the mediating role of scientific representations. Se-
veral authors [i.e. Morrison and Morgan, 1999; Cartwright, 1983; Knuutti-
la 2005, etc.] have elaborated approaches on the role of scientific models as
mediators in scientific inquiries. However, these authors share a tendency
to diminish representation, by arguing that the emphasis on representation
does not do justice to the various roles of models in science. On the contra-
ry, I maintain that it is exactly their representational status, properly con-
strued, that allows us to account for their role in scientific practice. I main-
tain that a model represents its target system, as long as it successfully con-
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veys and/or explains (some of) its features. It is not my intention in this
paper to deploy in detail my understanding on the issue of representation in
science; rather, I would like to elaborate my views on the mediating role of
scientific representations, by drawing lessons from Vygotsky’s understan-
ding of mediation.
Mediation is a central concept in Vygotsky’s view of cognitive deve-
lopment. It roughly means that human beings interpose tools between them
and their environment, in order to modify it for the sake of obtaining certain
benefits. It is via mediation that we, as human beings, learn to ascribe mea-
ning and to internalize areas of life that are not instantly relevant to our im-
mediate existence (for further discussion, see: Vygotsky, 1987; Wertsch,
2007; Karpov and Haywood, 1998).
According to Vygotsky, all higher human mental functions are pro-
ducts of mediated activity. The role of the mediator is played by a psycho-
logical tool or sign, such as words, graphs, algebra symbols, or a physical
tool. These forms of mediation are themselves products of the socio-histo-
rical context. Action mediated by signs is the fundamental mechanism
which links the external social world to internal human mental processes.
Thus, symbolic mediation is characteristic of higher mental processes.
Vygotsky holds that, by issuing activity mediators, humans are able to
modify the environment and this is exactly what is characteristic about hu-
mans’ way of interacting with nature. There are two hallmarks in the medi-
ated way in which humans interact with the environment; namely, the use
of tools within social organized activities and the use of language as a cul-
tural form of mediation. In the evolution of humankind, one can trace a mo-
tion towards more complex structures of activity, being mediated by more
complex tools, which leads to the production of more complex mental
structures.
People convert social relations into psychological functions by em-
ploying different types of signs as mediators between their minds and their
environment. The common feature of these various kinds of psychological
tools is that they are acquired through culture, the aggregation of prior ge-
nerations’ acquired knowledge. Vygotsky notes that the most important
sign-mediated behaviour that occurs in cognitive development is the use of
abstract language, which appears as detached from the individual features
of the environment.
Language (and speech, of course) as a mediating tool, is used by the
growing child to talk, plan, think. Thus, it becomes part of child’s cognitive
system. During this process, other symbolic tools are also being internali-
zed, i.e. mathematical, visual thinking etc. It is important to underline that,
according to Vygotsky, there are no universal signs, because signs are de-
veloped cooperatively within a given culture. If, instead of the developing
child, we think of a scientific community that turns to investigate a specific
problem or, even broadly construed, works in the same field of inquiry, one
could read in the above lines how the acquisition of scientific knowledge is
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being developed starting from the first, premature and probably at large
mistaken scientific representations employed in our inquiries up to the hig-
her level of command of the specific domain of research, that the scientific
community eventually hopes to reach. The several models concerning the
atomic structure which have been proposed throughout the history of
science could serve as a helpful example.
I would like to highlight that the Vygotskian concept of mediation ra-
dically differs from any empiricist or positivist understanding of mental re-
presentation. Vygotskian mediation does not contradict at all the idea that
thought can embrace an independent world, since mediators are not placed
in a metaphysically peculiar layer between reality and us2. Within the con-
text of my perspective, this is presupposed in the proposal to understand
scientific representations as if they mediate scientific cognition in a tool-li-
ke fashion. A scientific representation pilots and enacts scientist’s cogniti-
ve intervention with the object of cognition.
In the abovementioned sense, I contend that scientific cognition is me-
diated by scientific representations. Following once again Vygotsky’s un-
derstanding of concepts and paraphrasing it in terms of scientific represen-
tations, I propose that scientific representations are introduced when our
existing cognitive tools are unable to provide answers to questions which
are raised in the course of our scientific inquiries.
One should bear in mind that Vygotsky introduces consciousness as a
responsive function; consciousness is the body’s capacity to become the
stimulus of its own acts through its own acts (Vygotsky, 1925/1997: 71).
Therefore, in my approach, scientific representations yield novel ways of
thinking and acting, which were unavailable to the cognizing subject, the
human-agent prior to their introduction. Hence, scientific representations
not only facilitate our engagement in certain, already existing problems,
but they also contribute formulating new questions that may guide new
forms of practical activity or enable us to unveil new phenomena as objects
of cognition. In this sense, each new scientific representation a scientist in-
troduces, does not appear in vacuum; it is based on the ‘thought material’
that our already existing cognitive apparatus, which was so far employed in
the scientific endeavor, provided us. For example, in mathematics, the sa-
me mathematical signs could be argued to mediate two processes: the deve-
lopment of a mathematical concept in the individual and that individual’s
interaction with the already codified and socially sanctioned mathematical
world [Radford, 2000]. In this way, the individual’s mathematical
knowledge is both cognitively and socially constituted.
There is a point I would like to stress. According to Vygotsky, con-
cepts, as well as sign systems, are tool-like or instrumental systems. For
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This is a significant reason why I favor this alternative to Cartwright’s (and others’)
conception of the mediating role of models, according to which models occupy the middle
space between the theory and the world.
Vygotsky, ‘tools’ and ‘signs’ are not interchangeable, but analogical, in the
sense that the sign acts as an instrument of psychological activity in a man-
ner analogous to the role of a tool in labour [Vygotsky, 1978: 52]. While
both tools and signs are mediating artifacts, they do not mediate the same
kind of activities, since tools mediate object-oriented material activity,
whereas signs mediate social interactions of various types. By characteri-
zing scientific representations as ‘tools for scientific cognition’, I do not re-
nounce Vygotsky’s terminology and distinction; rather I attempt to high-
light and specify the objective character of scientific representations and
their indestructible bonds with reality, in order to juxtapose my views to ot-
hers, which are popular in the relevant literature nowadays.
In the abovementioned sense, what Vygotsky teaches about the princi-
pal role that ‘signs’ play in mediating the emergence of consciousness and
the construction of knowledge on the part of individuals during the course
of their ontogenetic development, is analogous to the view I endorse about
the role of scientific representations, as ‘tools‘ for scientific cognition.
Hence, with regard to my main concern in this paper, I maintain that
scientific representations mediate scientific cognition in a tool-like fashion
(like Vygotsky’s signs). Scientific representations surrogate the real pro-
cesses or effects under study, by conveying some of the features of the re-
presented systems. Thus, they serve as generalized images of reality, with
which scientists interact in the course of their inquiries.
For example, when working on introducing the double-helix model,
Watson and Crick were striving to make their model comply with experi-
mental data, to embody previously acquainted knowledge in it, to increase
its explanatory capacity. In this sense, they were building their model as an
investigative instrument, as a workable representation of the actual structu-
re of DNA molecules. It was not the need to establish a structural relation
between the model and its target that guided them in their efforts. The re-
presentational status of the model was judged and determined in the con-
text of the specific inquiry, since it is proved that it successfully conveys
and explains (some of) the features of the target system.
‘Zone of proximal development’ and scientific
cognition
Let me proceed by invoking another Vygotskian concept, the ‘zone of
proximal development’ (ZPD), in order to shed more light on the function
of scientific representations in scientific cognition.
An important aspect of Vygotsky’s theory is the idea that the potential
for cognitive development is limited to a ‘zone of proximal develop-
ment’ — ZPD (for a detailed discussion, see: [Vygotsky, 1978; Chaiklin,
2003; Obukhova & Korepanova, 2009]). Vygotsky proposes “that an ess-
ential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of proximal develop-
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ment; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal developmental proces-
ses that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in
his environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once these processes
are internalized, they become part of the child’s independent developmen-
tal achievement” [Vygotsky, 1978: 90].
We can think of ZPD as the area of exploration for which an individual
is cognitively prepared, but unable to fully develop without help and social
interaction. The individual should be supported in order to evolve under-
standing of knowledge domains or development of complex skills. Proxi-
mal indicates behaviors or skills closest to emergence at any given time —
not all possible behaviors or skills that will eventually emerge. Thus, ZPD
is actually the area between actual competence level and the potential deve-
lopment level. It is based on the mental functions which are not yet mature,
but are in the process of maturation.
It should be noted that ZPD is a zone and not a point because it covers a
continuum from a lower level of a skill to its mastery. However, the actual
skill will vary depending on instruction, circumstances, etc. The lowest le-
vel is the actual level of development; below that level, the skill has been
mastered. The upper level is the potential level of development; everything
above is beyond the limits and unachievable for now. Thus, the area bet-
ween lower and upper level includes everything that can be achieved in
terms of current competency. In other words, ZPD contains skills in proxi-
mity to the last mastered level. It should also be clarified that ZPD is not li-
mitless, which means that an individual cannot learn anything at any given
time; s/he cannot learn skills or behaviors that exceed his or hers ZPD.
It is obvious that each domain of knowledge has its own zone. Moreo-
ver, ZPD is a dynamic zone, in the sense that with mastery of one level, the
entire zone moves up. In other words, ZPD is not static but shifts as the in-
dividual attains a higher level any given time. This process is repeated over
and over again, as the individual, within the context of his or hers social in-
teractions, climbs the way to complete acquisition of a body of knowledge,
skill, strategy, discipline, or behavior. This also implies that ZPD is diffe-
rent for different areas of development or at different times during the ac-
quisition process; it may even vary in size with respect to different do-
mains.
I maintain that the concept of ZPD could be worked upon, in order to
elucidate aspects of the function of scientific representations in scientific
cognition. Let me use the term ‘zone of proximal development in scientific
cognition’ (ZPD-SC) in order to set an analogy between the Vygotskian
conception of ZPD and my concerns here.
ZPD-SC could be conceived of as the area of exploration for which a
scientific community working in a certain research area is cognitively pre-
pared, but unable to fully develop. It is confined due to the restrictions po-
sed by our scientific concepts, models and theories which are embodied in
the scientific representation employed in the inquiries of the specific do-
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main. ZPD-SC contains skills in proximity to the last mastered level. It
could be argued that these skills are provided due to the effect of misrepre-
sentation. Our scientific representations, as truth-hunters, are forcing us to
investigate further within ZPD-SC, in order it to be shifted as the scientific
community attains a higher level any given time. This process is repeated
in due time, as the scientific community, within the context of its social in-
teractions, climbs the way to acquisition of a body of knowledge or disci-
pline, or behavior.
In other words, the scientific representations a scientific community
employs in the inquiries conducted in a specific field in a given era, are pin-
pointing to the upper limits of the knowledge that can be discovered about
the specific research area in their terms. Moreover, they are replaced by ot-
hers, when a higher level of mastery upon this research area has been mas-
tered by the scientific community (within the potential scope of the ‘old’
representation). It may be the case that an individual researcher has been
able to build a representation that reaches beyond current levels of experti-
se in terms of scientific community. However, this turns out to be a step
which will be completed only when it becomes possible that the communi-
ty is mature to move towards the next level.
Let us recall the example of the photoelectric effect. It has been under
study for some time and the explanation of the experimental findings was
limited by the level of mastery upon the nature of light and propagation of
energy that the scientific community had reached. However, scientific fin-
dings of that time, were already pinpointing to the solution of the problem:
Planck had already discovered the quantization of energy. It was about
time that the community was mature to overthrow its conceptual and repre-
sentational machinery in order to conquer a new understanding of, i.e. wa-
ve-particle duality, which in turn came to pinpoint to further development
of science, i.e. quantum mechanics.
In lieu of conclusion
In this paper, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific represen-
tations by drawing inspiration from Vygotsky. Specifically, I worked upon
Vygotsky’s understanding on the nature and function of concepts, mediati-
on and zone of proximal development and tried to build analogies with se-
veral aspects and functions of scientific representations, as they are em-
ployed in scientific inquiries.
I maintain that scientific representations mediate scientific cognition
in a tool-like fashion (like Vygotsky’s signs). Scientific representations are
consciously acquired through deliberate inquiry in a specific context, whe-
re it turns to be part of a whole system, reflecting the social practices related
to scientific inquiry, just as scientific concepts do in Vygotsky’s understan-
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ding. They surrogate the real processes or effects under study, by convey-
ing some of the features of the represented systems.
Furthermore, I propose that Vygotsky’s solution to the problem of the
ontological status of concepts points to an analogous understanding for ab-
stract models, which should be regarded neither as fictions nor as abstract
objects.
Admittedly, this paper offers a descriptive outline rather than a com-
prehensive approach; however, this should not necessarily be thought of as
a fault, since my main motivation was to introduce a Vygotskian perspecti-
ve to the ongoing vivid debate on the issue and to beget further discussion.
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